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In sum, as the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution protects against being tried twice for the same
offense, the Supreme Court in Ashe v. SwensonW also found that
the doctrine of collateral estoppel is "embodied in the Fifth

Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy."229 A defendant
may avail himself of this doctrine if he proves that the issues
involved have, necessarily been determined in his favor in a prior
trial. 20 Similarly, in addition to its constitutional protections,
New York State has statutes" prohibiting a party from being
tried separately for two offenses based on the same transaction
unless the elements of each charge are substantially different and
distinguishable, z2 and contrary verdicts would be consistent. 3
In Quamina, since there existed "substantially different elements"
in each count, the court found no double jeopardy violation?24

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM
SECOND JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
People v. SteelePI
(decided April 4, 1997)
third degree when.., he possess any explosive incendiary bomb, bombshell,
firearm, silencer, machine-gun or any other firearm or weapon simulating a
machine-gun and which is adaptable for such use." Id.
' Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
229Id. at 445.
23 See People v. Acevedo, 69 N.Y.2d 478, 485, 508 N.E.2d 665, 669, 515
N.Y.S.2d. 753, 758 (1987). See also People v. Goodman, 69 N.Y.2d 32, 37,
503 N.E.2d 996, 999, 571 N.Y.S.2d 565, 568 (1986); People v. Berkowitz,
50 N.Y.2d 333, 344, 406 N.E.2d 783, 788-89, 428 N.Y.S.2d 927, 932
(1980); People v. LoCicero, 14 N.Y.2d 374, 380, 200 N.E.2d 622, 625, 251
N.Y.S.2d 953, 957 (1964).
231 See N.Y. CRmi. PROC. LAW § 40.20, supra note 136. See also N.Y.
CRiM. PRoc. LAw § 310.70, supra note 3.
232
See N.Y. Cmi. PRoc. LAW § 40.20 (2) (a-b) supra note 136.
23 See N.Y. CRIt. PROC. LAw § 310.70 (2) (a) supra note 136.
People v. Quamina, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 612 (2d Dep't 1997).
172 Misc. 2d 860, 661 N.Y.S.2d 908 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't 1997).
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The People appealed the lower court's dismissal of charges
stemming from defendant's prosecution under sections 1192(2)
and (3)236 of the New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law

[hereinafter

"VTL"]

following the court's suspension of

defendant's license pursuant to VTL § 1193(2)(e)(7). 23 7 The
lower court stated that prosecution under VTL §§ 1192(2) and (3)
amounted to "multiple punishments for the same offense." 38
Additionally, the court stated that with the VTL § 1192(2) charge
dismissed, the doctrine of collateral estoppel and New York
Criminal Procedure Law [hereinafter "CPL"] § 40.40(1) 23
236

N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 1192(2), 1192(3) (McKinney 1996).

Section 1192(2) provides:
Driving while intoxicated; per se. No person shall operate a
motor vehicle while such person has .10 of one percent or
more by weight of alcohol in the person's blood as shown by
chemical analysis of such person's blood, breath, urine or
saliva, made pursuant to the provisions of section eleven
hundred ninety-four of this article.
Id. Section 1192(3) provides: "Driving while intoxicated. No person shall
operate a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition." Id.
" Steele, 172 Misc. 2d at 861, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 909. See N.Y. VEI- &
TRAF. LAW 1193(2) (McKinney 1996). Section 1193(2)(e)(7) provides for the

suspension of a person's driver's license pending prosecution for driving with
an excessive blood alcohol content and states:
A court shall suspend a driver's license, pending prosecution,
of any person charged with a violation of subdivision two or
three of section eleven hundred ninety two of this article
who, at the time of arrest, is alleged to have had .10 on one
percent or more by weight of alcohol in such driver's blood
as shown by chemical analysis of blood, breath, urine or
saliva, made pursuant to subdivision two or three of section
eleven-hundred ninety-four of this article.
Id.
23 Steele, 172 Misc. 2d at 861, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
239 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 40.40(1) (McKinney 1992). Section 40.40(1)
provides in pertinent part:
Where two or more offenses are joinable in a single
accusatory instrument against a person by reason of being
based upon the same criminal transaction

.

.

.

such person

may not, under circumstances prescribed in this section, be
separately prosecuted for such offenses even though such
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charge. 240

on the remaining

927
VTL

On appeal the Supreme Court, Appellate

Term, found that even though VTL §§ 1192(2) and 1193(2)(e)(7)

constitute the same offense with regard to double jeopardy
concerns, they do not constitute separate prosecutions.24
Further, the court also found that §§ 1192(3) and 1193(2)(e)(7)

do not constitute the same offense for purposes of double
barred by
jeopardy and consequently, such prosecution "was not
"
the doctrine of collateral estoppel or CPL § 40.40(1). 242
In finding that the double jeopardy rights granted by the United
States Constitution 43 and the New York State Constitution " were
not violated, the court referred to its own decision in People v.
Conrad.245 In Conrad, the court found that prosecution of a
violation of VTL § 1192(2) was not precluded by the preliminary
license suspension mandated by VTL § 1192(2)(e)(7) because the
"purpose and effect" of the suspension was as "a remedial

sanction" 2' and did not qualify as a separate prosecution. 47 With
no finding of a separate prosecution for the same offense, the
court thus held that prosecution of a VTL § 1192(3) violation was
separate prosecutions are not otherwise barred by any other
section of this article.
Id.

Steele, 172 Misc. 2d at 861, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
Id. at 861, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
242 Id.
The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent
243 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
[
part: " N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put
240

241

in jeopardy of life or limb. . . ." Id.
244 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This section provides in pertinent part: " [ N]o
person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense ....
Id.
245 169 Misc. 2d 1066, 654 N.Y.S.2d 226 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't 1997).
In Conrad, defendant was charged with the violation of VTL §§ 1192 and (3).
Id. at 1067, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 227. Pursuant to VTL § 1193 (2)(e)(7),
defendant's driver's license was suspended, and thereafter, the lower court
dismissed the remaining charges holding that any such further prosecution
would
amount to multiple punishments for the same offense. Id.
246
Id. at 1068, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 226.
247 Id.
The court reasoned that the operation of § 1192(2) and
§ 1193(2)(e)(7) are part of the same prosecution. Id.
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not barred by the preliminary license suspension under VTL
§ 1193(2)(e)(7).24'
Turning to the lower court's application of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, the Appellate Term relied on the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Blockburger v. United States,2 49 to
define what constitutes the "same offense" for purposes of
double jeopardy concerns.50 In Blockburger, defendant was
convicted of three counts of unlawful narcotics distributions" in
violation of the Harrison Narcotics Act.1 2 In his petition to the
Court, defendant contended that the two sales charged in the
second and third counts "as having been made to the same
person" should have been considered a single offense5 3 The
Court summarily rejected this argument stating that in deciding
whether or not an act is violative of two "distinct statutory
provisions" a court must ask "whether each provision requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does not." 254 The
Steele court, with the federal standard of defining a single offense
Id. at 1071, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 230.
284 U.S. 299 (1932). In Blockburger, the indictment contained a total of
five counts upon which the jury rendered a verdict against the defendant on the
second, third, and fifth counts. Id. at 300-01. The second count alleged that
defendant had sold ten grains of a narcotic substance on a specific day with the
third count alleging that defendant had made another unlawful sale to the same
buyer the following day. Id. The Court sentenced defendant to a prison term
of five years on each count (with the terms to run consecutively) and, in
addition, fined defendant a total of $6,000. Id.
250 People v. Steele, 172 Misc. 2d 860, 861, 661 N.Y.S.2d 908, 909 (Sup.
Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't 1997).
248
249

z" Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
2

Id. See also 26 U.S.C. § 692. The Harrison Narcotics Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to purchase, sell, dispense
or distribute any of the aforesaid drugs [opium and other
narcotics] except in the original stamped package or from the
original stamped package; and the absence of appropriate taxpaid stamps from any of the aforesaid drugs shall be prima
evidence of a violation of this section by the person in whose
possession same may be found.

Id.
253

25 4

Blockburger, 284 U.S at 301.

Id. at 304.
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as expressed in Blockburger, then addressed the standard adopted

by New York that could be found in the New York Court of
Appeals decision of In Re Corbin v. Hillery.25 In Corbin,
defendant was involved in a motor vehicle accident that resulted
in a fatality.5 6 Upon pleading guilty to a VTL § 1192(3) charge
of driving while impaired,

defendant moved to dismiss the

remaining charges of reckless manslaughter, vehicular homicide,
The
criminally negligent homicide, and reckless assault.Y
5
8
The Court of Appeals
county court denied defendant's motion
9
reversed and ordered the remaining charges to be dropped,
stating that further prosecution after a plea of guilty to the VTL
2
§ 1192(3) amounted to a violation of double jeopardy rights. 6
The court held that in order for an act to be considered the same
offense, the crimes must have "[e]ssentially the same statutory
25- 74 N.Y.2d 279, 543 N.E.2d 714, 545 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1989). In Corbin, it
was alleged that defendant's car had crossed over the yellow line, colliding
with two other vehicles and yielding substantial bodily injuries including one
fatality. Id. at 282, 543 N.E.2d at 714, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 72. Tests performed
on defendant after the accident yielded a .19% blood alcohol level. Id. at 283,
543 N.E.2d at 716, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 73. Somehow, the return date on the
misdemeanor charges of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and
driving on the wrong side of the road was changed so that the return date on
those charges was two days earlier than originally scheduled. Id. In
consequence, the District Attorney's office that later wanted to press more
serious charges of reckless manslaughter and vehicular manslaughter was not
present on this earlier date as it was not their night to "cover" the Town
Justice Court. Id. With the office handling the principle case absent,
defendant, with counsel, pled guilty to the two misdemeanor charges. Id.
When the District Attorney's office later handed down an indictment charging
the more serious manslaughter charges, defendant immediately moved to
dismiss the indictment charging the more serious manslaughter charges,
defendant immediately moved to dismiss the indictment citing double jeopardy
violations. Id. The County Court denied defendant's petition. Id. at 285, 543
N.E.2d at 717, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 74. The Appellate Division dismissed the
petition's Article 78 proceeding and the appeal was taken as of right on
constitutional grounds, by the Court of Appeals. Id.
256 Id. at 283, 543 N.E.2d at 715, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 72.
2 Id. at 285, 543 N.E.2d at 717, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 283, 543 N.E.2d at 715, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 72.
2w Id. at 290, 543 N.E.2d at 720, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 77.
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elements or one must be a lesser included offense of the other., 261
The Court of Appeals, knowing that the prosecution was
intending to use the same proof for both the original pled-to
charges and the remaining more serious charges, held that the
"[s]ubstantial double jeopardy problem
. . . is apparent on the
2

26
face of the People's pleadings here."
In assessing the double jeopardy considerations under the
Federal and State Constitutions, the Steele court applied an
essentially identical test in deciding whether or not the
prosecution of a single act amounted to multiple punishments for
the same act.263 The federal test employed asks whether or not
each provision of a statute requires "[p]roof of an additional act
which the other does not 264 while the state standard demands that
in order for an act to be considered the same offense, the crimes
must have "[e]ssentially the same statutory elements or one must

be a lesser included offense of the other. "' 26

In their basic

effects, both standards afford their invokees the same level of
protection.

261 Id. at 543
262id.at 543

N.E.2d at 719, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 76.
N.E.2d at 720, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 77.
263 People v. Steele, 172 Misc. 2d 860, 863, 661 N.Y.S.2d 908, 910 (Sup.
Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't 1997).
264 Blockburger v. United States 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
265 Corbin, 74 N.Y.S.2d at 289, 543 N.E.2d at 719, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 76.
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